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Introduction
Ecologists are fundamentally more dubious about "progress" than economists. This difference hasbecome increasingly accentuated since World War 11 with the loss of the broader Western ideals of progress
and the rapid increase in population, material consumption and ecosystem transformation. That which
economists point to with pride, ecologists point to with dismay( I ). Yet economists and ecologists explore
complex systems ina manner sufficiciently similar that there have been critical conceptual transfers. Darwin
and Wallace credit Malthus with alerting them to the dynamics of a population meetin a resource constraint.
The mathematical models of population biology are the same as those used to describe economic markets.The optimization models of ecology are similar to those of production economics. The similarities arc
well documented(?).
Some economists apply their knowledge to ecosystem protection and some ecologists apply theirknowledge to economic development. Nevertheless, the two disciplines are seen as the scientific
components of juxtaposed world views(3). Economic and ecological arguments tend to he invoked bypeople with different values, different interpretations of the nature of systems and, consequently, differentpolicy recommendations with respect to how people should relate to their environment. Many look toa I legelian resolution of these opposing world views to get us beyond the present development-environment
confrontation and guide us through the next century. Such a resolution would entail new concentrationsin those areas where economics and ecology have different beliefs about knowing. It is in this broad
context that I compare the models and knowledge of the two disciplines.
The Path of this Inquiry
Let me classify scientists according to their belief's about science by two criteria with two categories
of each criteria. First, scientists either believe in objective knowledge, or positivism, or they do not. Second,
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scicntists either hclic\e that sCienec is leading 10n+ard a unified set of universal laws. a belief I label
conceptual unitisni , or they believe that we will only known reality through an array of incongrous ways
of looking at it , it belief I label conceptual pluralism ( 4). Positivism and unitism have been central tenets
of Western science which , though long questioned , profoundly influence our social organization and process
of decision - making. In my judgment , the resolution between the economic and ecological world views
entail it resolution of these beliefs . Scientists ' beliefs, of course , do not easily fit into it simple two by
two matrix. These categories serve my inquiry well but are not meant to serve other equally important
explorations.
Economists - whether neoclassical , marxist or without an orthodoxy - tend to be positivists and
unitists in the face of a long history of debate . Ecologists tend to be positivists and conceptual pluralists
by default. Neither discipline ' s position will survive the confrontation , let alone it synthesis , of the two.
This inquiry reflects my beliefs and hopes . I am a post - positive conceptual pluralist searching for
the key to sustaining cultural and biological diversity . Since how we perceive affects our decisions and
thereby the evolution of both the social and natural world with which we interact , I believe that conceptual
diversity is an epistemological stance that will sustain both biological and cultural diversity.
I perceive more pluralism in ecology than in economics , thus economists will find that I slight the
virtues of their methodology. But since pluralism in ecology exists by default rather than by choice,
ecologists will find that I am making a virtue of what most consider to be their weakness . Both will
discover that I am not simply comparing the methodological practices and beliefs of each discipline but
ant also making an argument for post - positive conceptual pluralism as a component of the resolution.
Some Difficulties of Methodological Comparison
The Aristotelian notion that things fall into categories because they have unique essences is commonly
held. The terms "economist" and "ecologist" call forth distinct images. Economists Milton Friedman and
Paul Samuelson have fought over economic interpretation for years, but certainly their views are closer
to each other than they are to those of ecologists Paul Ehrlich and Daniel Janzen, who also have their
differences. Each discipline must have a special essence which can he definitively identified so that they
can be sorted into types. But, like the problem of defining species in biology, every rule denies the
differentiation and happenstance that explains the evolution and speciation of ideas in the disciplines(5).
This logical paradox deserves elaboration.
The market model is the dominant paradigm among North American and European economists. This
model links individuals -as suppliers of labor, capital, and land and as demanders of products and services-
through numerous markets. Economists have steadily developed the model over the past two centuries
through more refined mathematical treatment. Parameters are also now estimated through increasingly
sophisticated econometric analyses of generally better and better data. The steady progress in the
development of the model has led to broad acceptance among a growing and increasingly powerful
profession. Many economists are convinced that it provides profound insight into questions of markets
and economic efficiency and hence much of economic policy.
Critics of economics, on the other hand, are dismayed by the simplicity of the assumptions behind
the model and the fact that mathematical elaboration and statistical estimation have not resulted in an
accumulation of knowledge that is usuahle from one year to the next(6). Economists with a much more
historical leaning competed successfully with the simple use of the market model into the early part of
the twentieth century. Historical, institutional and marxist economists still dominate in a significant portion
of the universities in Europe and in it few in the United States. They have always questioned how economists
who predict and prescribe solely on the basis of the market model think they know. In addition to this
diversity in views with respect to the dominant model, the vast majority of economists have harbored
various non-market models to explain the aggregate levels of output, employment and inflation.
Economics has it dominant paradigm, but it is not monolithic. The patterns of economic thinking
over time, across regions, on different problems and by schools of thought are not easily generalized.
Likewise, the levels of methodological confidence and questioning in economics have varied over time
and across schools. Patterns of thought and methodological confidence are even less readily characterized
fix ecology where an array of different models are used to pursue different questions.
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Ecologists are becoming very conscious of their methodology. Indeed, a large portion of the literature
has a strong methodological slant(7). The methodology of economics is coming under increasing attack
and economists are beginning to respond(8). This surge in epistemological pondering adds to the difficulties
of characterizing how each discipline knows.
Problems with generalizations lead directly to problems with documentation. I tun presenting an
interpretation of my exposure to the literatures and behavior of both disciplines.. Even if this paper were
a dissertation in philosophy replete with collections of documentary quotes, another scholar could assemble
another set of quotes supporting an alternative interpretation with different insights. Insights, even different
insights for each of us, but certainly not universal truths or even a few stray usable facts, are th( best
that our querying will yield.
Terminological Elaboration
Pusitiri.sm. Western science sought to know the universal characteristics of an unchanging natural
world. Knowledge of how things actually were led science to become a powerful, separate authority that
often countered the church and state. Conflict was avoided through a division of responsibility. Religion
assumed the role of questioning and transferring values; science questioned and transferred knowledge
about how things were; and the state served a functional role in between, linking the desirable to the
possible.
Belief both in the link between science and progress and in the objectivity of science, the waning
role of the church and the perceived difficulty of democratic decision-making in a technically complex
world led to a new alliance between science and the state. The progressive movement, perhaps best
characterized by beliefs (luring the 1920s and 1930s but still with us today, envisioned politically neutral
scientists making decisions on the public's behalf under the broad guidance of elected officials. The
development-environment debate of the past quarter century has been one of the major erosive forces
of the progressive alliance. Advocacy science is now widely practiced, but neither advocacy science nor
progressivism enjoy a supporting public philosophy(9).
Unitism. Many believe that the various disciplines of science are leading toward one consistent set
of' laws about the nature of all things. To be sure, most of the disciplines are isolated islands no", but
many of the physical sciences and microbiological sciences already join in some places. Other parts of
islands can at least be temporarily bridged with sufficient interdisciplinary effort. And on the whole, as
scientists continue their inquiries, the sea of ignorance will recede until it is perhaps entirely gone. Models
mirror reality and falsification, the universal method of science, will ultimately assure the unity by
eliminating false reflections. Existing disciplines, or at least one's own, are islands rather than entangled
kelp adrift in the currents. Unitism is a cluster of beliefs that is consistent with progress in the physical
sciences until this century and in much of microbiology since.
Conceptual pluralism consists of a different cluster of beliefs(IO). Systems are complex. The
complexity is different across cultures for economic systems, across physical environments for ecological
systems and over time in both. The universal laws and much of the knowledge of the physical sciences
are applicable to economics and ecology but lend little to our understanding of them as systems We
can look at them as mechanical systems oral evolving but must concentrate our vision on different categories
of relations, parts, subsystems or levels of aggregation. No one way of looking at complex systems gives
complete understanding, each gives some insights, there are no logically consistent approaches to
aggregating the ways of understanding together and never will he. Models are necessarily simplifications
and hence necessarily imperfect instruments for looking into reality. Multiple models provide perspectives
on a question, acting as a safety net against mistaken action based on only one way of knowing.
Those who believe in the eventual unity of knowledge also tend to he positivists. These two combine
to a belief in comprehensive rationality, the idea that individuals and organizations can and should [Hake
decisions on the basis of complete information and its rational processing through consistently linked
models. Formal knowledge supports comprehensive rationality as the legitimate form of decision-making.
Formal knowledge, of course, is not completely developed and sufficient data cannot always be collected.
But accepted models should be pushed as far as they can he and data collected to the extent possible.
The limits to formal knowledge should be pushed back so that politically agreed upon decision rules,
experiential knowledge and tradition need be relied upon as little as possible. Politics, experiential
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knowledge and tradition are unfortunate necessities, but belief in the eventual unity of the sciences sustains
the belief that comprehensive rationality will at least be possible in the future.
Conceptual pluralism, on the other hand, links formal knowledge to decision-making through informal
knowledge and institutions. The multiple insights of diverse models provide a rich base of knowledge
for action. Rut it is too rich to facilitate the rush into ill-considered action - the chemical control of insects
without con,ideringagroecosystemdynamics,thedevelopment of nuclear power generation facilities w ithout
considering waste containment - that has become the focus of criticism of the dominant relation between
science and action. Ecologists, of course, are famous for arguing that science is inadequate to support
action. But their position is usually based on incomplete knowledge, it comprehensive rationalist argument,
rather than on the conflicting insights of conceptual pluralism. In the pluralists' view, individuals and
organizations reach decisions by combining scientific knowledge with experiential knowledge, judgment,
politically agreed upon decision rules and organizational structure, habits and traditions. The very social
phenomena that are begrudgingly accepted as "fallback approaches" by the unitists are seen by conceptual
pluralists as the only way to link science to action.
Epistemological Beliefs
Enlightenment philosophers sought to free men from unreason, from the idols of the mind. from
all that kept them from knowing and acting upon pure, universal truth. Philosophers and scientists flowed
rather freely from the discoveries and methods of the natural sciences into social inquiry for two reasons.
First, unreason with respect to things social appeared so plentiful that the temptation could not be avoided.
Second, the new knowledge of the physical sciences could only be the engine of progress if society
abandoned irrational traditions. "Through this cross over, social inquiry received it strong influx of beliefs
with respect to objectivity and universal laws that dominated its character during the 19th century and
heavily influences it today.
There was, however, an important exception. The German historical school contended that everything
social was conditioned by history, all history was conditioned by human values and action, and it differed
from place to place. Many late 19th century American economists were trained in this tradition in Germany,
but only a few returned as serious scholars of economic history( I I ). At the turn of the century. a debate
among German social scientists known as the "methodenstreit" pitted those who believed the social sciences
should have their own methodology which acknowledged the influence of values on history and on
interpretation against those who argued for the adoption of the positivist, value-free methodology of the
physical sciences. The positivists acquired the high ground such that methodologies which acknowledged
values as it part of the methodology became only something of which others might be accused( 12).
Early economists idolized Newton. Present day mathematical economics emulates his mechanics.
Economists have assumed the epistemological beliefs of physics. Even marxists, infamous for pointing
out how orthodox economic thinking is it product of capitalism, borrow from the language of physics
and believe theirown theory of history is based on universal laws. Institutionalists have also sought coherent,
positive theory.
In fact economics consists of logical arguments that can more or less tell any story desired. The
downward slope of demand curves is the only thing that approaches a law. There are neither relationships,
other than demand, nor constants which have been shown to be universal. Nor do economists test for
these. While economists now recognize that they do not practice their methodological beliefs, the debate
is almost evenly divided between those who think they should and those who argue that economists need
to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the methodologies they actually use and work toward an
epistemological stance appropriate to the nature of investigating economic systems and question,( 13).
The long history of near agreement on epistemological beliefs in economics, even though these beliefs
have not been practiced, contributed to an environment in which innovation could he discouraged. Orthodox
economists have been quick to argue that the arguments and conclusions of innovators have not been
tested and probably never could be tested. At it minimum, the epistemological consensus contributed to
the polarity between the orthodox and not. Members of each school of thought have enjoyed the camaraderie
of pointing out the methodological insincerity of the others. These methodological arguments in economics
reduce to: "Your emperor has no clothes".
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The development of methodological beliefs in ecology are more difficult to trace than in economics.
Evolutionary theory has stimulated clearly defined epistemological debates( 14). Other fields of biology
have not. Ernst Mayr argues(15):
"Some historians of science like to distinguish different periods, each with a single dominant paradigm
(Kuhn), episteme (Foucault), or research tradition. This interpretation does not fit the situation in biology.
Ever since the later seventeenth century, one finds more and more often that even within a given biological
discipline or specialization, two seemingly incompatible paradigms may exist side by side, like
preformation and epigenesis, mechanism and vitalism, iatrophysics and iatrochemistry, deism and natural
theology, or catastrophism and uniformitarianism, to mention only a few of the numerous polarities."
Discerning patterns and critical episodes in the development of ecological methodology is also
hampered by the relative newness of the discipline. Ecological thought goes hack to the ancients, observers
of natural history increasingly observed the interactions of species and environmental features, but the
term ecology was first proposed by Ernst Haeckel in 1866 while the term ecosystem was not coined by
A.G. Tansley until 1935. The development of ecology as a body of thought and of ecology as a discipline
is a twentieth century phenomena(l6). Even so, the boundaries between the biological disciplines are
not so well demarcated by professional association and practice as are those of the social sciences. As
a consequence, the sociology of knowledge in ecology has been influenced by all of biology.
A methodological literature distinct to ecology is only now developing. Jonathan Roughgarden, a
mathematical evolutionary ecologist, has been at one of its epicenters(17). His arguments are distinctly
pluralistic both respect to methods and paradigms. Like many who have promoted the use to mathematics,
he makes it clear that mathematical exploration is only one approach to thinking about systems. He also
argues that ecologists will not find universal patterns. Those who practice other approaches, however,
are distinctly fearful of formalization while at least hopeful of universals. Roughgarden argues(18):.
"There is antagonism among many ecologists toward theory, and some of it arises, I suspect, from
the fear that ecological theory is considered the "foundation" of ecology. Some sciences, like physics,
are hierarchical and physicists speak of theoretical axioms, laws, and of "truths" that have been derived
from such theory. In a hierarchical field, it is conceivable that a misdirected theory could divert the entire
field away from a commonsense evaluation of its own empirical findings; if so this is a legitimate fear.
Ecology does not have such a hierarchy now, I doubt if it ever will, and hope it never does. It is difficult
to imagine what could ever qualify as a "law" in ecology. Ecological theory is no more than a collection
of tools. A useless model should be discarded like a broken chisel."
Roughgarden also holds controversial views with respect to observation and testing. Forexample( 19):
"Any belief that scientists establish facts with more certainty than we can in our everyday lives
is a delusion. Our distinctive activity as scientists is that we encounter and experience phenomena that
are remote from everyday lives or that are overlooked during our everyday lives; but the way we try
to understand phenomena is with abilities whose credibility originates in everyday circumstances "
"As scientists we use experimental setups, specialized equiment and statistical techniques more often
than we do in our daily lives; but all this is a metter of degree, not kind. In our daily lives we test the
speed limit, sample clothes, alter recipes, and so forth: all activities with parallels in the practice of scientific
inquiry."
I think Roughgarden's interpretive views represent the common sense of the discipline. But it is
a common sense that embarasses when made explicit. The responses to his arguments indicate that the
dominant epistemological beliefs of science are "officially" held in ecology even if they are impossible
to follow, much as in economics(20). Hence I argue that conceptual pluralism exists in ecology by default
rather than by choice, though the choice could easily be made since the practice is so widely tolerated.
Lastly, ecologists have avoided the issues of possitivism by emphasizing " natural " systems. Few
systems, of course, have not been perturbed by people(21). Ecologists are certainly comfortable noting
how modern agroecosystems are a product of our beliefs in science, noting how modern agricultural
problems in particular stem from the paucity of systems thinking in the agricultural sciences(22). Still,
they prescribe from a stance of "right thinking" rather than from within the system. The growing interest
in agroecology, how traditional farmers have evolved agroecosystems, has brought ecologists and
anthropologists together and promises epistemological enrichment and confusion for ecology. These
ecosystems cannot he understood without incorporating design and selective pressure through agricultural
practices and how these were formed by beliefs about ecology(23).
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Research .Style
The conceptual pluralism of ecologists and the unitism of economists have coevolved with their
approaches to research and are clearly visible in their respective research styles today. A logical argument
supports the observation. First, scientists who study complex systems in only one way - whether through
mathematical models, laboratory simulations, field research, and, though to a lesser extent, historical
research - are more likely to hold to the unity of science view. Scientists who study systems through
multiple approaches are more likely to he conceptual pluralists. Second, through a multiple of approaches
are used in both disciplines, individual economists are more prone to specialize than ecologists.
The first premise has its own internal consistency. Different conceptual frameworks have different
methodologies and techniques of analysis in nearly it one to one relationship(24). Field research builds
a very different type of understanding of systems than does the pursuit of the nature of systems dynamics
through mathematical exploration. If we observe individual researchers practicing different techniques,
they are probably conceptual pluralists.
The second premise can be empirically supported. Field knowledge, indeed repeated field experience,
has been and is still almost a prerequisite to being an ecologist. Ecologists tend to eclectically fit novel
field observations into various conceptual patterns. Only a few economists do field work for their PhD
dissertations and only a portion of these individuals continue to base their work on direct observations
Ihereafter)25).
Economists are noted for their tendency to look for data or case studies which fit predetermined
models rather than to select models to explain preselected events. There are, of course, exceptions in
both disciplines. Most notable are the rising breed of mathematical ecologists. Within economics the
dwindling breed of institutionalists are exceptions as well as a few who, because they emphasize particular
industries, explain specific events. Equally important, economists before World War 11 were much more
prone to fit economic behavior, industrial structures and historic episodes to alternative patterns of thinking.
Individual economists who work with models of production functions, partial market equilibrium,
computable general market equilibrium and industry input-output may appear to be practicing different
methods. While the structures of these models look different, they are either parts or alternative
simplifications of the overall market model. Many economists do work with both market and macro
economic models where the market model has never aggregated to the macro. The profession, however,
has long worked on and lamented over this incongruence. The attempts and laments themselves document
economists' belief in unitism(26).
Within ecology, population, food-web and other models are not thought to he simplifications or
subsets of an accepted general model. Ecologists have tried, in what they term the "mechanistic" approach,
to build systems models from basic biological principles(27). These attempts are analogous to the efforts
by economists to build macro models from market principles. Ecologists, however, seem much more
philosophical about the lack of progress in their efforts. At the same time, it is only fair to note that
some economists have recently begun to advocate methodological pluralism(28).
The Problem of Context
The disciplines share two problems of context. The first is the problem of history. Both ecology
and economics attempt to explain systems in terms of relationships between the parts in a particular time
period, yet the parts and relationships stem from earlier phenomena that are not included in the model.
Economics is not history; ecology is not evolution. Yet history and evolution steadily make the parameters
of the models of each discipline obsolete such that they can only predict a little way into the future.
The second is the problem of regional differences. Economic relations are affected by the types of
consumption and production activities accepted or encouraged within particular cultures while ecological
relations are affected by the characteristics of species compatible with particular physical environments
and the coevolutionary path followed in particular regions. The differences in the ways in which ecology
and economics have handled temporal and areal differences support the overall argument of this paper
with respect to unity and pluralism.
Ecological and evolutionary theory have enriched each other. During the first century of evolutionary
thinking, niche and hence fitness were primarily thought of in terms of the physical environment which
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has always emphasized the other species with which a species interacts. To he sure. evolutionists have
long been fascinated with how bigger teeth or longer legs might enhance survival viz a vii other animals,
but it took ecological thinking to put individually adaptive responses into a systems context. Evolutionary
thinking is also very common in ecological thinking. The two bodies of knowledge, however, are by
no means formally integrated. Ecologists think like evolutionists and vice versa because each think in
multiple patterns(29).
The major differences between ecosystems are noted in courses on principles of biology and stressed
in courses on ecology. Indeed, there are separate courses on specific ecosystems. Students are expected
to learn that succession is a reasonably productive concept for thinking about the dynamics of temperate
forests while light gap is a more meaningful concept for tropical forests. Ecologists change concepts to
fit the context. They can also he very concerned about the boundaries of their systems(30).
Economics used to be like ecology is now. Economists used to know sociology, political theory,
history and geography and relied upon these disciplines to understand how societies worked, changed
and were different from place to place. Economics helps link or describe the interactions between things,
but the things of economics are largely historical and cultural artifacts. Max Weber argues(3I ):
"Accordingly, the fantastic claim has occasionally been made for economic theories - e.g. the abstract
theories of price, interest, rent, etc. - that they can, by ostensibly following the analogy of physical science
propositions, be validly applied to the derivation of quantitatively stated conclusions from given real
premises, since given the ends, economic behavior with respect to means is unambigously "determined".
This claim tails to observe that in order to be able to reach this result even in the simplest case, the
totality of the existing historical reality including every one of its causal relationships must be assumed
as "given" and presupposed as known! But if this type of knowledge were accessible to the finite mind
of man, abstract theory would have no cognitive value whatsoever."
Frank Knight reaches a similar conclusion by a less tortuous route(32).
"Hence it will he evident that the other methods or approaches to economic data, notable historical
research and statistical investigation are not to be thought of as substitutes for sound theory, along the
traditional lines, but as complementary to it. This is true also of social sciences other than history and
statistics, notably phychology, with or without such qualifiers as social, political, analytic, etc. All are
needed to supply data and interpretation, to put content and definiteness into the valid but highly abstract
"laws" of economic choice and market phenomena. Without such supplementation, economic laws have
little value for prediction, since the essential factor of wants is not open to sense observation and any
course of events that occurs can be fitted into the theoretical pattern."
Sir John Hicks gets to the same conclusions most concisely(33).
"It is because the phenomena with which economics deals is so narrow that economists are continually
butting their heads against its boundaries."
This understanding of theory and context, of how economics relates to the other social sciences,
has been nearly lost over the past half century. In its place has grown quite the opposite understanding.
Economics has now expanded its domain into history, politics, and sociology)34). Economic arguments
have been developed to explain how history unfolds, politicians maneuver and people find partners.
Economics students are still expected to have a general social science education, but very little more
so than biologists. There are no social science prerequisites to economics comparable to the physics,
chemistry, and microbiology that students of ecology are expected to know.
The dominant strain of economics treats other cultures as evolutionary misfits or as evolutionary
precursors. Other cultures are undeveloped because they have institutions comparable to the feudal system
of Europe which impede free choice by individuals(35). As these institutions are eliminated, as they will
he and must be for development to proceed, economic explanations will fit better and better This
interpretations is no doubt too harsh, but economic prescription almost invariably consists of making
societies more like the model. Neither history nor culture still present it contextual challenge to unitism
in economics.
The ways in which economists and ecologists handle the problems of areal and temporal differences
support the hypothesis that ecologists are conceptual pluralists while economists are unitists. Hirshleifer
closes his essay on the expanding domain of economics with the following expression of faith in the
eventual unity of science(36).
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"I must conclude very briefly, in pursuing their respective imperialist destinies, economics and
sociobiology have arrived in different ways at what is ultimately the same master pattern of social theory
- one into which the phenomena studied by the various social sciences to some extent already have been,
and ultimately will all be, fitted."
Responses to Logical and Empirical Inconsistency
The argument that economists are unitises while ecologists are pluralists is supported by the way
each discipline has reacted to logical inconsistencies in their theory. Theories are simplifications on reality
that should at least be logically consistent. In both economics and ecology, theories have been accepted
which have subsequently been shown to he logically inconsistent. While the scientific challenges to the
two disciplines have been similar, their responses have been decidedly different.
For perhaps halt a century, ecologists accepted the theory that diverse ecosystems are more stable
than simple ecosystems. A mixture of evidence and arguments supported the theory. Population variations
were perceived to he small in the tropics where there are many species compared to in the arctic where
populations variations are large and the number of species are few; mixed grass prairies have lower variation
in their biomass than hay-fields: the law of large numbers ought to apply to ecosystems. and predators
in diverse systems can more likely choose between prey so that prey and predator population crashes
are avoidable. Diversity-stability "theory" generated many of the prescriptions for ecosystem management
beyond those directed toward individual species.
By the mid- 1970s it became clear, though not yet broadly accepted within the discipline, that diversity-
stability theory was based on arguments that intermixed different definitions of the key terms, stability
and diversity, and that the logic did not hold up to mathematical exploration(37). The controversy divided
the profession, pitting the mathematically inclined against the pragmatic and field oriented. After intense
rethinking and discussion the profession now has a much richer understanding of how theory might only
be gospel and of how different types of diversity relate to different definitions of stability. Unfortunately,
the new found knowledge does not generate universal prescriptions fox ecosystem management.
Economists have also accepted theories for which there has been little testing for theoretical
consistency. After much debate in the 1950s, the majority of the profession accepted during the 1960s
the I licks-Hansen-Samuelson formulation of Keynes' General Theory. The I 970s proved this simplification
inadequate, largely because it left too many important strings untied. As in the case of ecology, the
economics profession is much more wary of macroeconomic pronouncements. This experience, however,
is not quite equivalent to that of the diversity-stability controversy in ecology where a too simple theory
was identified and rejected through questioning and debate within the discipline rather than by the march
of history
A more revealing challenge to economics has paralleled the development of the market model.
Institutional, historical, and marxist economists have consistently argued that the assumptions and logic
of the model narrowly restrict its prescriptive application. For example, whether both or even either nation
experiences gains from trade depends on specific conditions: labor and capital mobility: all resources
and environmental services being owned by fully informed, prescient owners; no transactions costs, etc
- yet these conditions are rarely, it ever, actually investigated when economists prescribe free trade. As
mathematical proofs became popular. Lipsey and Lancaster demonstrated that economic prescriptions
must he tailored to the specific circumstances unless all of the assumptions, but the one for which a correction
is being recommended, of market theory were true for the specific case(38). The point was logically
irrefutable, hut rather than respond as did ecologists, economists discussed its implications for a while
and then effectively ignored it. Incorporating logically correct theory would have entailed digging into
the specifics of cacti case, the nifty gritty of social and environmental systems, which would entail using
knowledge beyond economics.
With the rise in environmental awareness during the 1970s, economists took market failure seriously,
undertook extensive conceptual and empirical research, and published thousands of articles. Yet they
continued to assume that markets existed for the vast majority of human interrelationship such that
distortions overall were small and values for non-market goods could still he determined from how people
behaved(39). Such an approach is illogical unless the distorsions to market prices due to market failure
are very small. It is difficult to imagine the appropriate empirical measure of the overall distortions of'
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the questions has not been pursued(40).
Social Environments
What is accepted as knowledge within a discipline is as much influenced by the social environment
of the discipline as by the training, epistemological beliefs and research style of its members(41). Several
works emphasizing the sociology of economics have appeared in the past decade. They argue how individual
economists' find it in their interest to contribute to the mainstream, ignore critiques thereof, reject alternative
theories and isolate alternative theorists(42). With respect to academic economists, Peter Earl argues(43).
"Our analysis leads to two connected ways of explaining the dominance of neoclassical economics.
One is that it is safer and more rewarding to he an equilibrium theorist of the conventional kind. The
other is that upbringings affect the constructions young economists form of what it is that economists
do and they then act in conformity with this image unless given an exceedingly strong cause to behave
otherwise."
Arguments with respect to risk or patterning, however, are also applicable to ecology, yet oserall
thinking is not nearly so channeled in ecology as in economics. In general, studies of the sociology of
economics seem to presume that only one theory will ultimately prevail and merely question why the
neoclassical paradigm has neither advanced significantly nor been replaced. Thus while this literature
addresses models and knowledge in economics, it assumes the unitism that distinguishes economics from
ecology.
There is, however, a major sociological difference that night explain why economists are unitists.
Economists in great numbers work closely with policy makers in major international agencies like the
World Bank, nearly every national agency and the major corporations and banks. Marxists argue that
economists are "dogged" about neoclassical theory because it legitimizes and sustains those in power
and thereby legitimizes and sustains the economics profession as well(44). Other economic theories would
legitimize and sustain other power structures and thereby economics, but it would not he the same profession
or professionals after the transition.
Economists, of course, see themselves as responsible merely to a cold logic that not infrequently
confronts power(45). Confrontation certainly occurs, but confrontation is relative. To the extent that
neoclassical economics, the dominant public philosophy, and the distribution of power are mutually
reinforcing, confrontation is minimal. Alternative conceptual frameworks question so much of the status
quo that they would confront every aspect of power and be of little use to policy makers. Alternative
conceptual frameworks, in effect, are alternative images of how the economic and social order could
he. Thus orthodox economists, in true positivist tradition, can easily portray alternative frameworks as
unrealistic, untestable, and subjective and, hence, triply unscientific. Post-positivist philosophers see the
positivists chasing their tail. What sort of "workable" relations might evolve between knowledge, social
structure and action in a post-positive world, however, are by no means clear.
Policy makers and laymen often joke about how economists always give different answers But
the difference in the answers are due to differences in assumptions about the state of the economy rather
than about assumptions with respect to how the economy should he modeled. I argued earlier that the
policy prescriptions of economics tend to be with respect to how the economy should he constructed,
i.e. free trade and the use of monetary rules by the Federal Reserve, rather than how much of a tax increase
is needed to balance the budget. In this sense, the dominance of the belief in the neoclassical model generates
considerable consensus on policy. The consensus gives the dominant practitioners in the profession power
which is used against those who would erode the consensus.
Concluding Thought
One might describe the meshing of public philosophy, economic theory, the roles of economists
and the economy using biological concepts and language. The meshing process can be portrayed as
coevolution whereby each component increasingly reflects characteristics of each other. Each component
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has evolved under the selective pressure of hose the other components have responded to evolutional}
responses and random changes in the other.
Ecosystems also evolve in response to how we think we know. Traditional agricultural systems reflect
the cultural myths and social organization of their people. To a considerable extent, modern agricultural
policy, agroecosysterns, the agricultural chemical industry and the disciplines of agricultural chemistry
and much of entomology have coevolved. This coevolution, however, appears to he leading toward the
extinction of its participants. Relatively few transformations, however, stern from the application of
ecological thinking. '['here have, of course, been feedbacks between ecology and public philosophy, but
the dominant feedback has been a negative, corrective feedback to economic philosophy, rather than a
positive, reinforcing feedback. Modern public philosophy, ecology, ecologists and ecosystems have not
coevolved.
The mirroring of economics as public philosophy, theory, social organization and profession can
be explained in several ways. From here I can only speculate. Is itjust a coincidence that this coevolutionary,
positive feedback process favored unity instead of disunity'? Might it proliferation of theories lead to a
proliferation of beliefs and forms of social organization that support a further proliferation of theories,
beliefs and forms, or is there something special about unity'? Is it not the essence of culture'? And if so,
if an ecological world view were to become dominant in our culture, would not the safety net of conceptual
pluralism in ecology disappear'?
Alternatively, perhaps we have learned something from the environmental and cultural destruction
of the 20th century. Perhaps we are approaching the time when we can choose a global safety net by
deliberately fostering conceptual, and hence organizational, diversity. Perhaps we could even facilitate
the rise of new, local cultures in a process of retribalizalion that would allow the few remaining non-
Western cultures niches of their own. In such a world, both economics and ecology would be non-positivistic
and conceptually pluralistic by choice.
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